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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
:JIUD CONTROL LABORATORIES, 
INC,. A Corporation, 
Appellant) 
vs. 
THERON S. COVEY, et al, 
Respondents and 
Cross-Appellants. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
AND CROSS-APPELLANTS 
STATEMENTOFFACTS 
Case No. 
8025 
The statement of facts in Appellant's brief is gen-
erally accurate and satisfactory to Respondents and 
Cross-Appellants. The Appellant has limited its appeal 
to the question of interstate commerce which makes ab-
stracting the record almost superfluous. 
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The finding-~ of Fact and Conclusions of Law were 
carefully considered by counsel and the trial court and 
,, .... , tiiPrPJ'ore, limit our additional statement of facts on 
t liP i~~uP~ rai~ed by the Appellant to quoting from Find-
ing~ of I~\wt 13 and 16, which are partially covered at 
page~ ;> and () of Appellant's brief. In addition to the 
mattt·r~ stated by Appellant these findings state that 
~. J. Putnan1 had authority to solicit business from new 
customers, subject to approval of the home office; that 
a quantity of supplies were kept on the L. N. Liscombe 
property at \~ernal, l~tah, from which sales were made 
to a large number of customers; that Putnam's office 
was on the same premises where he had a laboratory for 
doing experimental work connected with the use of Ap-
pellant's products (see Exhibit 10); that Appellant paid 
for a telephone in \~ernal, L~tah, had its sign at the en-
trance of the Liscombe premises and on Putnam's car; 
that all products sold at 'Ternal, Utah, were sold at the 
same price to each customer without discount and that 
billing was done from Appellant's office in Oklahoma 
City where the computation of prevailing market price 
was 1nade and shown on the delivery ticket and invoice 
sent to the purchaser (R. 241). All of Appellant's prod-
ucts were put up in packages suitable for shipping and 
in appropriate size, Inaterial and shape for direct use 
from the packages ( R. 242). 
FACTS ON CROSS APPEAL 
Respondents have filed notice of Cross-Appeal (R. 
I l 
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:2-l-9) and have designated certain points to be considered 
on Cro~s-Appeal (R. :250). 
The Findings of Fact refer to the joint operating 
agreement and recite that the well was drilled in accord-
ance therewith and that certain pipe was furnished hy 
Respondents referred to in the agreement. .M. E. Baird 
and H. L. Robbins were co-partners operating as Baird 
and Robbins Drilling Company and under such narne 
jointly with Respondents the well was drilled (R. 239). 
rrhe joint operating agreen1ent authorized Baird and 
Robbins to utilize the services of a corporation to be 
wholly owned by them and on or about December 26, 
1948, said persons formed "Baird and Robbins Drilling 
Company, Inc." the affairs of which corporation were 
conducted in such manner as to make it a fraud and a 
fiction with no separateness frmn the partnership or 
the individuals. Appellant, in selling and delivering the 
products involved in this lawsuit "did not rely upon the 
separate and independent credit of the defendants Covey" 
(R. 240). 
Sales in Utah frmn the Vernal warehouse prior to 
qualification in lTtah were substantial and numerous 
(R. -l-7). 
The joint operating agreement is :B~xhibit C, and 
contains the following provisions deemed material to 
the Cross-Appeal on the question whether a mining part-
nership existed between Baird and Robbins, or their 
partnership, or their corporation and the Respondentf'. 
"THIS AGRgFJl\1ENT, entered into this 5th 
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4 
day of January, 1949, by and between M. E. Baird 
and H. L. Robbins, a partnership, with their prin-
eipal place of business in Salt Lake City, Utah, and 
Hybil 'r. Baird, wife of M. E. Baird, first parties, 
hereinafter called 'operator,' and S. M. Covey, 
A. A. Covey, H. 'r. Covey, S. U. Covey, T. S. Covey 
and F. K. Gilroy, hereinafter called 'Coveys,' 
second parties, hereinafter collectively called 'non-
operators.' 
I. CONSIDERATION 
A. Non-operators agree to pay first par-
ties the smn of Sixteen Thousand Dol-
lars ($16,000.00) as follows: Eight 
Thousand Dollars ( $8,000.00) concur-
rently with the following and Eight 
Thousand Dollars ( $8,000.00) upon the 
commencement of the drilling the first 
well as described in paragraph IV 
herein: 
C. Non-operators further agree to pur-
chase pipe of a description hereafter 
to be agreed upon by the parties at a 
cost of not to exceed Seven Thousand, 
Five Hundred Dollars ($7,500.00), 
which pipe shall be owned by Coveys 
and available subject to the conditions 
hereinafter set forth. Coveys agree 
to deliver their checks, payable to 
owner and seller of said pipe, from 
whom operator agrees to obtain bill 
of sale to said pipe, in favor of the 
second parties. 
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II. EFFEC'rlYE PERIOD 
This ag-reentent is to rentain in force 
for the full tenn of any and all of the 
leases or agreentenb as heretofore de-
scribed and of any renewals or exten-
sions thereof, whether by production 
or otherwise. It is expressly under-
stood and agreed between the parties 
hereto that by these presents the first 
parties have transferred to the Second 
parties twelve per cent ( 12o/o) of the 
one hundred per cent (100%) interest. 
III. POSSESION OF OPERATOR 
A. Operator shall have the sole right of 
prospecting and exploring the lands, 
subject to this agreement, and drilling 
for, producing, storing, transporting 
and removing oil, gas and other hydro-
carbon substances, frmn the lands, sub-
ject to this agreernent, and the injec-
tion of water, other fluids or gas into 
the lands, subject to this agreement, 
together with the right, subject to the 
terms of the several leases herein de-
scribed, to establish, maintain and re-
pair on the lands or to remove there-
front tanks, boilers, buildings, ma-
chiner~· and other apparatus or equip-
ment, pipe lines, pole lines, power 
lines, telephone and telegraph lines, 
rods and other appurtenances which 
rnay be necessary or convenient in the 
production, treahuent, storage or 
transportation of oil, gas or other hy-
dro-carbon substances on or from the 
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lands as may be necessary for the pur-
poses of operating and carrying out 
the terms, provisions and purposes 
of this agreement. 
B. 'fhe number of employees, the selec-
tion of such employees, the hours of 
labor and compensation for services to 
be paid any and all such employees 
shall be solely at the discretion and 
determination of the operator and 
such employees shall be the employees 
of the operator and under its sole di-
rection and orders. 
IY. DEVELOP~lENT OF WELL ONE 
A. Operator agrees to drill a well on the 
land described in paragraph 1 of 'De-
scriptions' and at a location on said 
land determined by the operator and 
to commence the drilling of said well 
on or before the first day of February, 
1949. The Sixteen Thousand Dollars 
($16,000) hereinbefore named and paid 
to the first parties shall be used by 
the operator for payment of drilling 
and development charges in connec-
tion with the drilling of said well and 
no part of any costs or expenses for 
the drilling of said well or the main- I 
tenance of this lease, such as the pay- 1
1 
ment of Two Thousand Dollars ($2,-
000) as rental charge (should the pay-
ment of the same be necessary to con- I 
tinue said lease in full force and ef-
fect) shall be charged or be a claim 
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7 
upon the second parties. In thP event 
said wpll shall be a dn' hole, no costs, 
including ('O~b of abandonment, shall 
be a clai1n against second parties. If 
said well produces oil or gas in com-
Inereial quantities, all of the develop-
ment costs and expenses, including 
but not li1nited to, drilling, casing, tub-
ing, rods, pumping equipment, well 
head connections, separators and 
tanks, incurred by operator in connec-
tion with the drilling and equipment 
of said well for production, shall be 
borne and paid for exclusively by 
operator. 
B. Operator shall conduct its operation 
in a good and work1nanlike 1nanner 
and in accordance with good oil field 
practice. If operator so desires it may 
mnploy its own tools and equip1nent 
in the drilling of said well or it may 
en1ploy the services of a corporation 
wholly owned by operator in which 
event it is understood said corporation 
shall have no claim against the second 
parties, nor any lien against said lease-
hold or any oil, g·as or other hydro-
carbon substance-s produced on or 
from the lands. 
C. Operator herehy agrees and under-
takes to provide a corporate surety 
bond in the sum of not less than Ten 
Thousand Dollars ($10,000.00), pro-
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tecting, holding harmless and indem-
nifying the second parties from all 
adH or failures to act in connection 
with fi r~t parties' operations or its 
contracting parties under this agree-
ment, which bond shall he filed with 
Hecond parties. 
\.I. DEVI£LOP~IENT AND DISCOVERY 
All drilling and development by the 
operator shall be conducted in a good 
and workmanlike manner, in accord-
ance with good oil field practice. All 
drilling and development charges, ex-
cept for the first well as hereinbefore 
described, shall be charged to the joint 
account of the parties hereto under the 
terms and conditions described here-
in and as described in the accounting 
procedure attached hereto and marked 
'Exhibit B' and hereby made a part 
hereof, on the basis of two per cent 
(2%) to each of the Coveys, constitut-
ing twelve per cent (12%) as non-
operators and eighty-eight per cent 
(88%) to operator. 
VII. APPROVAL OF OPERATIONS BY 
NON-OPERATORS. 
A. The written approval of non-operators 
shall be required 
1. For the abandonment of any well 
which has produced oil or gas in 
commercial quantities for a peri-
od of thirty (30) days. 
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t), 
For any capital expenditure of 
operator in any sum in excess of 
Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000.-
00) for which non-operators will 
be expected to pay their share of 
the costs in cash, except that the 
written consent by non-operators 
of the drilling of any well shall be 
construed to rnean approval of 
all necessary expenditures in drill-
ing, completing and equipping 
such well, including the necessary 
lease tankage. 
For the sale and disposition of 
surplus materials and equipment 
by operator, it being understood 
that all equipment, facilities and 
structures purchased on account 
of the joint operation of the par-
ties hereto (except all such equip-
ment, facilities and structures 
placed on or nwved on the de-
scribed prernises hy operator for 
the drilling of the first well as 
herein described shall he pre-
stuned to be the property of the 
owner until non-owner shall prove 
differently. 'rhereafter all prop-
erty purchased shall be presumed 
to be joint property until oper-
a tor shall prove differently.) shall 
be owned eighty-eight per cent 
(88%) by operator, twelve per 
cent ( 1 =Z(?~) hy second parties. 
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B. The following specific rights, pnVI-
leges and obligations of non-operators, 
and each of them, are hereby expressly 
provided, but not by way of limitation 
or exclusion of any other rights, privi-
leges or obligations of the said party: 
1. Non-operators shall have access 
to the lands, suhject to this agree-
ment, at all reasonable times to 
inspect and observe operations of 
every kind and character upon the 
property. 
2. X on-operators shall have access 
at all reasonable times to any and 
all information pertaining to 
wells, drilling, production secured 
and oil marketed and to the books, 
records and vouchers relating to 
the operation of the lands, subject 
to this agreement. 
3. Operator shall, upon request, fur-
nish the non-operators with daily 
drilling reports, true and complete 
copies of well logs, as soon as pos-
sible after the preparation there-
of, tank tables, daily gauge and 
run tickets and reports of stock on . 
hand the first of each month; and 
shall also, upon request, make 
available samples and cuttings 
from any and all wells drilled in 
which non-operator has an inter-
est on the said lands. 
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YIII. DUTIEH OF OPERATOR 
A. Operator shall, at all times, keep the 
joint interests of the parties hereto in 
and to the leases and product there-
from and equipment free and clear of 
all labor and mechanic's liens and 
encumbrances. *.:•*** 
B. X on-operators shall have a lien on the 
interests of the operators in said leases 
and agreen1ents and the oil and gas 
produced therefrom, the proceeds 
thereof and the material and equip-
ment thereof to secure the payment of 
operator's proportionate share of the 
costs and expenses of developing and 
operating the said lands for the pur-
pose of keeping said property free 
and clear of liens and encun1brances 
upon the property of non-operators. 
Any surns recovered from the dispo-
sition of operator's property for the 
payment of the obligations of the 
operator shall be applied first to costs, 
second upon the obligations of the 
operator, and any balance remaining 
thereafter shall be paid to the operator 
or to it~ successors or assigns." 
:\fr. ~. J. Putnatn testified that he was employed by 
the Appellant as sales engineer and sales representative 
in Utah (R. 103). That in the spring of 1949 he was intro-
duced to a gentleman named Covey in Y ernal ( R. 106) 
and that this Mr. Covey said he wa~ interested in strik-
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ing gas in the Morrison formation, and that he had an 
interest in the (Slaugh) well. There was no discussion 
of whoHe credit was hack of the well operation (R. 107). 
Later, and in about ~~ ay or June, he asked Mr. Baird 
who was interested in the well and Mr. Baird named 
"The l 1oveys, Ken Garff, Hafer, and a Doctor or two" 
none of whom were familiar to the witness (R. 108-109). 
At that time l\lr. Baird advised him that the Coveys were 
going into the oil business in San Juan Basin (R. 108, 
109). 
l\lr. Putnam further testified that well-drillers need 
mud or che1nicals in a hurry when they need them and 
that suppliers must be on a 24-hour a day basis (R. 111). 
This is to avoid interrupting drilling operations (R. 113). 
Delivery tickets for suppliers were made out "in our 
warehouse" at Vernal, Utah, by Mr. Liscombe and 
occasionally by Putnam (R. 120). 
Mr. Putnam further testified that the material sold 
to Baird and Robbins was picked up at the warehouse 
usually by J. N. Karren or T. J. Colton and delivery 
tickets were made up at the time ( R. 122). 
On Cross-examination l\1r. Putnam testified that he 
made no credit investigation before commencing sales 
to Baird and Robbins (R. 127) and gave his company 
no advice as to their credit (R. 129). He made the 
arrangements with Mr. Liscombe for warehouse services 
and they were to pay him 15 cents per 100 pounds on 
everything that went out of the warehouse except· ten 
I IJL 
I iU] 
I 
I ;a; 
a~ I 
11:1 
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cents on barite ( R. 131). Liseomlw consulted with him 
on the replenishments and they endeavored to keep the 
supply up to where it should be (R. 13~). He never 
talked to any of the (_ 10Yeys concerning the supplies being 
delivered. The corporation operated in the same way 
before and after qualification in Utah (R. 143). Most of 
the supplies delivered 'vere via certificated carriers or 
wild catters, and Baird and Robbins were the only people 
who picked up most of their supplies at the warehouse 
(R. 1-±5 ). He testified in a number of hearings before 
the Public Service Con1mission of Utah in support of 
carriers to haul their products from the warehouse to 
the wells and understands that these were hearings con-
cerning intrastate conunerce (R. 148, 149). 
It is the Company's practice to sell to anyone drilling 
an oil well and normally he is able to pay ( R. 153). He 
and ~I r. Liscmnhe both had keys to the premises where 
the compan~''s products were stored (R. 154). 
Richard D. Ruckenbrod testified that he is an attor-
ney and prepared Articles of Incorporation for the 
Baird and Robbins Drilling Company, Inc. and that 
upon the incorporation, partnership activities ceased 
(R. 193, 194 & 198). 
The corporation 1nade ::-~ocial security and unemploy-
ment payments of its employees for the drilling of the 
Slaugh well (R. 209). The corporation also made with-
holding tax payments (R. :210). 
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POINTH RELIED ON 
{{p:-;pondents take issue with Appellant on the two 
({llP~tion:-; ~tatPd hy the Appellant as follows: 
Point One 
Sales of goods in interstate commerce are exempt from 
the provisions of Section 16-8-1 and 16-8-3 U. C. A. 1953. 
Point Two 
All of the sales concerned in this action are sales in 
interstate commerce under the original package doctrine. 
On their cross appeal Respondents also urge points 
of error which result in a finding that Respondents and 
Baird and Robbins were engaged in a mining partnership 
in the drilling of this well as follows : 
Point Three 
No evidence or law supports or justifies Finding of 
Fact No. 7, that the drilling corporation was a fraud and a 
fiction and a disregard of the corporate entity is not avail-
able to Appellant. 
Point Four 
No mining partnership existed. 
ARGUMENT 
Point One 
Sales of goods in interstate commerce are exempt from 
the provisions of Section 16-8-1 and 16-8-3 U. C. A. 1953. 
Respondents do not quarrel partcularly with this 
statement of the law; but including the statement in this 
case suggests an application beyond the mere statement. 
I tlif 
I 
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\Yhere a corporation is engaged only in intt>rstate cmn-
merce in a given state and has no other activities therein, 
the state1nent is proper. This is all that is involved in 
the cases cited by Appellant under this point. 
But the Court here found that the Appellant was 
doing business in the ~tate of Utah. The cases do not 
go so far as to hold that actions arising out of interstate 
eonunerce can be 1naintained in a state where the corpo-
ration is doing intrastate business without complying 
with the laws of that state. But this question is largely 
academic here because if the Appellant corporation was 
doing business in Ptah it was doing business because of 
the nature of the sales it was making. The characteristics 
of those sales constituted both a ter1nination of the 
interstate move1nent and the doing of business in Utah. 
These activities in nmking sales require compliance with 
the Statute. Point No. :2 is therefore controlling on 
Appellant's case. 
Point Two 
All of the sales concerned in this action are sales in 
interstate commerce under the original package doctrine. 
Here again, there is no great divergence of view 
between the Appellant and the Respondents. The review 
of the original package doctrine is factual and is impor-
tant in dealing with cases where the original packages 
are or could be broken prior to the 1naking of a sale 
which could be either interstate or local. l t is a convenient 
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line of demarcation. ln Dahnke-Walker Mining Company 
I'S. C. 1'. llmulnrant, ~-l-7 U.S. 282, 66 L. ed. 239, 42 S. Ct. :.c 
lOfi, <·ited at page Hi of Appellant's brief the treatment of 
original pa<~kages wa~ all dictum. But the limitations of 
t IH• do<· trine are indicated in Appellant's own cases. 
U·/clwllenberger us. l)ennsylvania, Austin vs. Tennessee 
aud Cook vs. illarshall Crmnty discussed at pages 33 to 
;);~ of Appellant's brief.) 
r:rhe question in this case ~~ whether anything is 
accomplished hy examining into whether the packages 
of a product have been changed or broken when the 
original packing case is of such size and construction 
as to be useable for shipping as well as for final use by 
the consumer. \Vhere there is no breaking of bulk and 
taking packages from a container or shipping case has 
the manufacturer been able to extend the concept of 
interstate commerce purely because the package was not 
changed from the tin1e it left the hands of the manufac-
turer until it was ultimately consumed~ Such a sug-
gestion ignores the position of the original package 
doctrine as a convenient rule of thumb and makes it a 
dogma of the law without reason. 
The question the court should be interested in is 
whether Appellant was engaged in business inUtah. If 
it was then the Court below correctly held that no action 
can be maintained on any sales made prior to qualifica-
tion. 
The cases hold generally that where interstate goods 
have come to rest, are displayed for sale, with orders 
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taken and sales initiated and completed after the goods 
have con1e to rest, it is an interstate business and the 
conunerce clause will not affect powers of the states to 
require qualification. 
In Aduan{'t>-Rwmley Thresher Company vs. Stohl, 75 
Utah 1:2-J., :2S3 Pac. 781 and Kansas City Wholesale vs. 
Weber Packing Corporation, 93 Utah -!14, 73 Pac. 2d 
1272, the entire business in Utah was involved in the 
isolated transactions brought before the court and there 
was no regular course of business within the State of 
rtah. The Court held that the sales were interstate, that 
the company was not doing business in Utah, and that 
the suits could be maintained. 
In 1.llarchant vs. National Reserve Compawy of 
America, 103 rtah 530 at 546, 137 Pac. 2d 331 at 337 
and 338 the court held that to constitute doing business 
in the State there must be a continuing course of business 
with some permanence about it. ':l_1hat is the significance 
of the evidence here that :Mud Control Laboratories did 
business in Utah in its usual way (R. 142) and did busi-
ness with a large number of customers in a very sub-
stantial volu1ne (Exhibit 3, Answer 12). Keeping an 
employee who was an engineer, establishing a laboratory, 
an office, a warehouse from which sales could be made 
(R. 241, :242) show that this was a regular part of the 
Appellant's business, and that it had both substance and 
permanence. 
The permanence was, of course, indicated when the 
corporation qualified in July, 1949, and has since that 
date continued to do business in the State of Ftah. 
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rl1he Appellant must succeed, if at all, on the isolated 
principle of the original package doctrine. The reference 
to the original package doctrine in Dahnke-Walker Min-
i ll.fl ( 'o111 pauy 1;s. C. T. Bondurant, 257 U. f.;. 282, 66, L. 
3d. ~:m, 4:2 S. Ct. 106 at page 17 of Appellant's brief is 
dictmn as the case involved the purchase of wheat in 
hulk. rrhe same i~ true of Wallace vs. Currin, 95 Fed. 
~d 856 cited at page 19 of the brief. This case involves 
grading of tobacco in bunches in warehouses and was 
held to be related to interstate commerce within the 
I 
I ~ 
Federal Grading and Inspection Act and could have had I ' 
no relationship to the original package doctrine. I 1 
Talbot vs. Smith, 277 S. \V. :257 is an original package 
case and goes a long way in holding that the transaction 
in that case did not involve doing business in the State 
of Kentucky. The case holds that where a North Caro-
lina concern sent 50 sets of aluminum ware to Kentucky 
and a crew of salesmen to take orders for the ware which 
orders were submitted to a Kentucky merchant for credit 
ok that the company was not doing business in the state. 
The distinguishing factors are obvious; in Talbot vs. 
Smith, the concern had no office, no regular stock of 
goods available for purchase by an agent or employee in 
Kentucky, had no employees and no regular course of 
doing business. 
Pace Manufacturing Company vs. Milliken, 70 Fed. 
Supp. 7 40 cited at page 20 of the brief contains no des-
cription of the packages and is based upon the doctrine 
that delivery is not complete while the goods are in 
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po~~e~sion of a carrier whieh ha~ moved the goods in an 
interstate shipn1ent, and that they, therefore, are not 
subject to the police power of the ~tate. The goods in 
that case were taken from the possession of the railway 
expre~~ agency following an interstate movement. 'J1he 
facts are so different a~ to make the (·a~p of no value. 
~\t page ~0, ~\ppellant eites the case of Department 
of Public Ctilities rs. Arkan~as-Lou.isiana Gas Company, 
108 S. \Y. :2d 586, 194 Ark. 354, aff. 58 S. Ct. 770, 304 
F. ~. 61, 82 L. 3d. 11-19, and a passage which is again 
dichun. This case involved sale of natural gas moving 
in an interstate pipe line and drawn from the pipe line 
for sale to customers in Arkansas. Despite the dictu1n 
the court held that the corporation was not sufficiently 
present in Arkansas as to be subject to the Arkansas 
Laws requiring the filing of comprehensive reports 
covering its business. 
It is plain from the cases of Schollenberger v. 
Pennsylvania, 171 r. S. 1, Austin rs. Tennessee, 179 U. S. 
343, Cook v. Marshall County, 196 U. S. 261, and Kir-
meyer L Kansas, 236 F. S. 568, discussed in Appellant's 
brief at pages 22-34, that the original package doctrine 
is useful in marking the point at which interstate ship-
ment ends and intrastate movement begins, but that the 
doctrine is only of evidentiary value and not an absolute 
rule. Where a large shipping box contains smaller boxes 
it is apparent that receipt of the large box, breaking its 
bulk and apportioning the s1naller boxes for local use is 
a convenient line of demarcation. For cigarettes in small 
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hoxPs it is insufficient to extend interstate commerce 
(Austin vs. Tewnessee, ~mpra, Cook vs. Marshall Co111nty, 
supra.) As applied to lumber, bulk grain, milk or gaso-
line in tanks the doctrine has little value. F'or instance 
in llaldwin vs. Sl~elig, 294 lT. f.;, 511 L. Ed. 1032,55 S. Ct. 
-l!)7, a New York regulation of milk designed to make the 
price of outside milk competitive with local milk was 
held invalid as a burden and restriction on interstate 
commerce and in holding that the form of the package 
was immaterial the Supreme Court said: 
"There are purposes for which merchandise, 
transported fr01n another state, will be treated as 
a part of the general 1nass of property at the 
state of destination though still in the original 
containers. * * * In brief, the test of the original 
package is not an ultimate principle. It is an 
illustration of a principle. * * * It marks a con-
venient boundary and one sufficiently precise 
save in exceptional conditions." 
and in Stanton and Sons vs. Los Angeles County, 78 Cal. 
App. 2d 181, 177 Pac. 2d 804, the court refused the origi-
nal package doctrine as related to shipments of lumber 
and referred to it in this manner: 
"The gossamer of law is the wrapping which 
makes a load of lumber the original package and 
when sorted and stacked with other loads for 
facility in selling the original package is broken." 
The Court cited F. May & Company vs. New Orleans, 178 
U. S. 496, 20 S. Ct. 977, 44 L. ed. 1165. 
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H'alling rs. Jacksonrillr Paper Company, 317 U. S. 
56-l:, S7 L. ed. -HiO, repre~ent~ a realistic approach to the 
problen1. rrhat ease involved the Federal Fair Labor 
Standards Aet which adrnittedly goe~ to the extreme of 
the power of l 'ongre~s over interstate commerce in regu-
lating working eonditions, hours, and pay of persons 
whose \Vork is connected with interstate commerce. In 
that ease a manufacturer out of the state shipped rnerch-
andise into Florida for handling in thre~ different ways: 
some shipments went direct from the rnill to customers 
in Florida: sonre shiprnents were made on special order 
and consigned to a branch office designated for delivery 
to a specific customer: and the balance, which was most 
of the business, .. was shipped to a branch warehouse 
without order and held subject to the taking o( orders 
frorn a fairly stahle group of customers as to kind and 
amount of merchandise so that their needs could be 
estimated with a fair degree of accuracy. rrhe Supreme 
Court held that the third category involved intrastate 
commerce and that the work of employees was beyond 
r· the Federal Fair Standards Act. At page 466 the 
Supreme Court said: 
"'l,he entry of the goods into the warehouse 
interrupts but does not necessarily terminate their 
interstate journey. A temporary pause in their 
transit does not mean that they are no longer 'in 
commerce' within the meaning of the act." 
This was true as to all of the goods but as to the third 
category the interruption was held to terminate the com-
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merce. The third category was like the goods of Mud 
Control Laboratories in this case which came to rest in 
\T ernal, were held for sale to any one of a number 
of customers representing a fairly stable group whose 
needs could be predicted with reasonable accuracy. 
The movement from the Vernal warehouse to the 
Baird and Robbins well site was intrastate commerce for 
rate purposes even though the movement was in the 
original packages. See Oregon Railroad amd Navigation 
Company vs. Campbell, 180 Fed. 253, 60 A. L. R. 1484. 
The fact that Mr. Putnam testified before the Public 
Service Commission of Utah in behalf of intrastate 
carriers is further evidence of the nature of the shipment. 
We see no essential difference between the Vernal 
warehouse and a store which sells cement, sugar, or 
drilling supplies which come into the state in bags of 
a convenient size for ultin1ate sale and use. :M:r. l{arren 
drove to Vernal in a Baird and Robbins truck, selected 
the merchandise he wanted, signed a delivery ticket for 
the merchandise, took it to the well site, and proceeded 
to use it. In the same manner would he go to a grocery 
store for a bag of sugar or salt needed by the drilling 
company and purchase it on credit. 
In Midlamd Lilnseed Products Company vs. Warren 
Brothers Co. (C.C.A. 6) 46 Fed. 2d 870, capacity to main-
tain an action was challenged and the court held that 
where barrels of linseed oil were shipped in carloads 
from out of the state and sold from a warehouse in the 
originai barrels that the corporation had to qualify as 
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doing business within the state, with no rnention of tlw 
original package doctrine. Senaca Textile Corp,ora,tion 
vs. Jlissuuri Flo·zcer & Feather Co. (Mo. app.) 119 S.W. 2d 
991 held that a corporation nmst qualify to bring suit 
on fact~ 8imilar to the operation in the principal case, 
there being no disclosure in the opinion of the type of 
merchandise involved or the type of package and no 
rnention of the original package doctrine. Dalton A.ddilng 
Jlachine Sales Company vs. Lindquist, 137 vVash. 375 
2-t.~ Pac. 643, 646, 647, involved facts very close to those 
in our case except that the product involved was adding 
machines and without discussing the original packages 
or the doctrine the court held that the corporation must 
qualify to maintain the action. In Star Square Auto-
Supply Compawy ~s. Gerk, 325 Mo. 968, 30 S. W. 2d 
447 at 460 after discussing a case which referred to the 
original package doctrine the court held that where 
auton1obile tires are received in interstate commerce, 
conuuingled with other tires and held for sale, the inter-
state commerce has ended, this being a police power case. 
Reliance Fertilizer Company vs. Davis, 124 Fla. 859, 169 
S. 579, involved capacity to sue and again without dis-
closing the forrn of packaging or discussing the original 
package doctrine the court held that shipment of ferti-
lizer into a state subject to taking orders and making· 
delivery involved doing business in the state and required 
qualification. The same holding was made where the 
erection of advertising signs was the doing business as 
found in National Sign Corporation vs. Moccar Cleve-
land Sales Corporation, 33 Ohio App. 89, 168 N. E. 758. 
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Dealing in barrels and kegs which were never opened 
hut which wPn• received in interstate commerce and sold 
t'rotu a war<>lwu~e wa~ involved in Hollingshead Corn~ 
J)(lll.'f rs. Uoker ( 1 ~J~G) -t rrenn. App. 362. There the 
Corporatiou wa~ doing intrastate business and could not 
maintain the ~uit although the original package doctrine 
wa~ not dise11~sed. Shipw<'nt of good:-_; to an agent who 
thereafter took orders and delivered the goods was held 
to be intrastate commerce in J ewe! Tea Company vs. 
Patillo, 50 Ga. App. 6:W, 178 S. E. 926, and Jewel Tea 
Company ~·s. Williams (C. C. A. 10) 118 Fed. 2d 202. 
It was held the corporation could not maintain the action 
because it was doing local business in Seidenback vs. A. 
E. Little Company, 146 Okla. 274, 294 Pac. 126, where. 
shoes were shipped into Oklahoma in interstate com-
merce and sold through a department store on a commis-
sion basis, title remaining in the out of state manu-
facturer until sold. 
It seems that the significant fact in these cases is 
the unimportance of the original package doctrine since 
it would n1ake such an easy point of decision for the 
courts to rely on if the doctrine had substantial signifi-
cance. 
If original packages served a purpose as shipping 
containers and if the point at which interstate commerce 
ended and intrastate commerce began were a difficult 
one, the original package doctrine would still have 
validity. But the courts have refused to be bound by 
this rule where the r·eason for the rule did not exist. 
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Here the court found the . \ ppellant wa~ doing business 
in Utah. Thi~ finding was possible only because inter-
state ship1uent had ended, the goods werp held in Utah 
awaiting custmner~, and the nwve1nent out of the ware-
house was an entirely separate, intrastate 1novement. 
Point Three 
No evidence or law supports or justifies Finding of 
Fact No. 7, that the drilling corporation was a fraud and a 
fiction and a disregard of the corporate entity is not avail-
able to Appellant. 
This is of great ilnportance because the corporation 
had no interest in the lease. It is a prerequisite to a 
mining partnership that there be a joint ownership in 
the lease or the land. Bentley vs. Brossard, 33 Utah 396, 
94 Pac. 736; 1lf eister vs. Farrow, 190 Mont. 1, 93 P. 2d 
753; U. 8. rs. Wholesale Oil Co. (C. C. A. 10) 154 P. 2d 
7-!5. 
If the corporation did the drilling and purchased 
supplies from Appellant there was no partnership with 
cross-appellants and no n1ining partnership. The Court 
avoided this question by finding the corporation to he 
a fraud and a fiction (Finding 7, R. 240). The court 
also found (Finding 5, R. 239) that the well was drilled 
by 1\L E. Baird and H. L. Robbins doing business as 
Baird and Robbins Drilling Company. This Finding 
might appear to follow necessarily from Finding No. 7, 
disregarding the corporate entity. If F'inding No. 7 was 
beyond the issues available to the Appellant, then the 
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new trial should have been granted to detennine who 
actually did the drilling-the corporation or the part-
ner~hip-without any impelled conclusion because the Di 
corporation was a fiction. 
'rher<> i~ much evidence that the corporation drilled 
the well. 1'he Joint Operating Agreement (Exhibit C) 
authorized Baird and Hobbins to drill the well through 
a closed corporation. rrhe Corporation had just been 
formed on December 31, 1948, when the Agreement was 
finally signed on January G, 1949 (R. 194, 197, 198, 199). 
And 1\lr. Ruckenbrod testified that upon formation of 
the corporation the partnership didn't function any more 
(R. 197). Appellant made no determination of whom or 
what Baird and Robbins were, but sent invoices to 
•· Baird and Robbins Drilling Co." and four to "Baird and 
Robbins" (Exhibit B). All delivery tickets likewise were 
in the name of "Baird and Robbins Drilling Co." except 
one to "Baird and Robbins" (Exhibit A). 
Appellant filed an action in the Fourth District 
Court against ''Baird and Robbins Drilling Company, 
a corporation" on or a·bout September 23, 1949, for this 
same cause of action, and obtained a judgment by default 
on December 9, 1949 after presentation of evidence 
(Exhibits 1 and 2). Exhibits 4 and 5 are checkbooks of 
the corporation showing that drilling expenses were paid 
with corporation checks. The corporation paid income 
withholding, soc'ial security and unemployment taxes on 
the drilling operations (R. 209-210). The bank account 
at Vernal was in the name of "Baird and Robbins Drill-
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ing· l'o., Inc." (Exhibit ~ and J~xhibits marked "Bank of 
Yernal" including eheeks and staten1ents). The Conti-
nental Bank and rrru~t Cmnpany account was in the name 
of "Baird and Robbins Drilling Co." (Exhibits F, G, and 
envelope ruarked July, 19-!~) but the checks used in that 
account were plainly marked "Baird and Robbins Drill-
ing Co., Inc." (Exhibib 6, 7, 5 and envelope marked 
July, 194~l). 
There is no evidence that Appellant made any 
inquiries about who was drilling the well and who would 
pay for it. Appellant simply sold mud and assumed 
that whoever was drilling the well would pay for it (R. 
153). ~ehere was no fraud, rnisleading, misrepresen ta-
tions, reliance or change of position. Appellant believed 
it was selling to a corporation, brought suit and took a 
judgment against the corporation. Now it seeks to 
create a windfall for itself by proving a partnership it 
never relied on in extending credit. 
Filing suit and obtaining judgment should estop the 
Appellant from changing its mind ( 13 Am. J ur. Corpo-
rations, sections 63 and 69), and is alrnost conclusive 
evidence of the party it believed it dealt with (See 
Exhibit 1). 
In order to clairn that the corporation was a fiction 
the person rnaking the clairn n1ust have been m'isled or 
must have relied to his prejudice on representations. 
The law as to disregarding the corporate entity is 
discussed in Sections 7 and 8 of 13 Am. J ur. on Corpo-
rations as follows: 
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"'rhe doctrine that a corporation is a legal 
en ~ity existing separate and apart from the per-
sons composing it is a legal theory introduced for 
purpoHes of convenience and to subserve the ends 
of justice. The eoncept cannot, therefore, be 
extended to a point beyond its reason and policy, 
and when invoked in support of an end subversive 
of this policy, will be disregarded by the courts. 
Thus, in an appropriate case and in furtherance 
of the ends of justice, a corporation and the 
individual or individuals owning all its stock and 
assets will be treated as identical, the corporate 
entity being disregarded where used as a cloak 
or cover for fraud or !illegality." 
Annotations on the question are at 1 A. L. R. 610 and 
34 A. L. R. 597. The general rule is that the corporate 
entity will not be disregarded with exceptions to this 
rule where creditors would be defrauded, where corpora-
tions are formed to avoid liability under contracts, or 
where individuals have attempted to shield themselves 
through a corporation. The later annotation at page 
602 quotes a rule for relief from Minifie vs. Rowley, 
187 Cal. 481, 202 Pac. 673 : 
"Before the acts and obligations of a corpora-
tion can be legally recognized as those of a par-
ticular person, and vice versa, the following com-
bination of dircumstances must be made to appear: 
First, that the corporation is not only influenced 
and governed by that person, but that there is 
such a unity of interest and ownership that the 
individuality, or separateness, of the sa'id person 
and corporation has ceased; second, that the 
facts are such that an adherence to the fiction of 
the separate existence of the corporation would, 
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under the particular eircmn~tant·e~, sanction a 
fraud or pron1ote injustiee." 
In Surgical Supply Center rs. lnd'llstrial Commis-
sion (Utah 1950) ~:23 Pac. 2nd 593 at page 596, the Court 
discU:3:3ed the rules as to disregarding a corporate entity 
in a ca:3e entirely different on its facts and observed: 
·•\Ye recognize that the courts have often 
looked through the veil of corporate structure in 
order to prevent fraud or injustice. Old Ben Coal 
Co. v. Universal Coal Co., 248 Mich. 486, 227 
X. \Y. 794; People ex rel. Attorney General vs. 
~Iichigan Bell Telephone Co., 246 Mich. 198, 224 
X. \Y. 438. However, no question of fraud is 
involved in the present case, and we find no occas-
sion to disregard the corporate entities of the two 
plaintiffs.'' 
Also in Geary vs. Cain, 79 rtah 268, 9 Pac. 2nd 396, 
the Court was dealing with fraudulent conveyances to a 
corporation and the possibility of ignoring the legal 
fiction in order to prevent fraud, holding, however, that 
because the stockholders were not the persons accused 
of comrnitting fraud, and that they did not hold the 
stock of the corporation in trust for the fraudulent per-
son the corporate fiction could not he disregarded but 
did say: 
··Courts of equity and courts of law as well, 
and courts which administer both law and equity 
in the same action, as do the courts of this state, 
will, to prevent fraud and accornplish justice, in 
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proper cases ignore the legal fiction that a corpo-
ration is a person separate and distinct from the 
person or group of persons who own its stock. 
Western Securities Co. v. Spiro, 62 Utah, 623, 
:2:21 P. H56; D. l. Felsenthal Co. v. Northern Assur-
ance (;o., 2g4 Ill. 343, 120 N. E. 268, 1 A. L. R. 
60:2, and annotation on page 610. *** The doctrine 
simply means that the courts, ignoring forms and 
looking to the substance of things, will regard 
the stockholders of a corporation as the owners of 
its property, or as the real parties in interest, 
whenever it is necessary to do so to prevent a 
fraud which might otherwise be perpetrated, to 
redress a wrong which might otherwise go with-
out redress, or to do justice which might other-
wise fail. It cannot be applied in this case, which 
is an action against the corporation and a person 
who holds but one share of its stock, so long as it 
appears that there are other stockholders, who 
are not parties to the action, owning all but one 
of the outstanding shares and it is not made to 
appear that they hold the same in trust for Addi-
son Cain." 
There is no evidence that after March 7, 1949, the 
date of the first sale by Appellant, there was any act 
connected with drilling except by and in behalf of the 
corporation. There is no evidence to support Finding 
No. 5 and it must be assumed that it followed, in the 
Court's reasoning, from Finding No. 7. This is a fallacy, 
because even if the corporate entity is to be disregarded 
the result would be to treat the stockholders as the 
responsible parties individually. Assume a joint ven-
\[' 
r: 
! ill 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
31 
ture between the corporation and cross-appellants and 
then sueh faets as require the corporate entity to be dis-
regarded. \Y ould not the result be to place the corporate 
obligation on the stoekholders, without any expansion of 
the obligations of the Respondents? The case of Geary 
L Cain (supra) seems apt. If there is fraud or other 
equitable basis for disregarding the corporate entity the 
stockholders will be held accountable but the rule will 
not apply where the stockholders are strangers to the 
fraud. ~o here, if the corporate entity is disregarded 
the brunt of the burden would fall, not on the stock-
holders of the corporation or on the persons responsible 
for creation of the corporation but on crss-appellants 
whose only offense was to deal with the corporation. 
The judgment of the Court allowing recovery against 
cross-appellants was based in part upon the finding that 
the corporation was a fraud and a fiction, which is wholly 
unsupported in the evidence and which is a position not 
available to Appellants against these Cross-Appellants. 
:Burthennore, there is no evidence to support the finding 
that the well was drilled by the partnership, and even 
if there were that evidence is so weak as to indicate that 
the court's finding was largely based upon its view that 
the corporate entity could be disregarded. A new trial 
should have been granted to determine, entirely apart 
from any tendency to disregard the corporate entity, 
whether the well was actually drilled by the corporation 
or the partnership. The burden of proof as to this was 
on Appellant. 
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Point Four 
No mining partnership existed. 
For two reasons there was no mining partnership, 
a part from the questions raised under Point Three: 
I~,i rst, there was no sharing of losses; 
Second, there was no joint control or operation. 
First, there was no sharing of losses. 
Had there been no mention of losses the law might 
imply a sharing of losses from a general operation to-
gether and from the sharing of profits. Cross-Appellants 
admit that the joint operating agreement provided for 
division of profits, 12% to cross-Appellants and 88% to 
Baird and Robbins. But this agreement was drawn to 
negative a sharing of losses and specifically accomplishes 
that. "The Coveys were willing to purchase interests 
only on certain conditions" (R. 199) and the joint opera-
ting agreement contains those provisions, as above 
quoted at pages 3 to 11. 
Paragraph I A of the Joint Operating Agreement 
limits the investment to $16,000 plus the purchase of pipe 
( Par. ID) the $16,000 to be used for "Development of 
Well One" (Par. IV) "and no part of any costs or 
expenses for the drilling of said well ... shall be charged 
or be a claim upon the second parties." A corporation 
owned by Baird and Robbins could drill the well "in 
which even it is understood said corporation shall have 
no claim against the second parties, nor any lien against 
I •;. 
I , 
~~ 
Br 
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said leasehold ... " (Par. I Y B). .-\nd further: "Opera-
tor shall, at all tinH:'s, keep the joint interests of the 
parties hereto in and to the leases and product therefrom 
and equipn1ent free and clear of all labor and mechanic's 
liens and eneumbrances. '' (Par. VIII A). 
The ea~es have not, and thi~ Court surely will not, 
impose a liability for losses on parties who have specifi-
eally contracted that the losses shall be borne by Baird 
and Robbins. X o policy of the law suggests this and 
no conduct of cross-appellant·s or act of reliance by 
Appellant suggests any equity in such a position. 
~lining partnerships are governed generally by 
partnership law with three essential differences: the 
interests are assignable, death of a partner does not cause 
dissolution, and authority of a partner to bind the part-
nership is limited to usual mining expense. Bentley v. 
Brossard, 33 Utah 396, 94 Pac. 736, 743. Therefore as to 
any question involved in this case, the law is the same. 
It is a requirement of both a general Inerchantice 
partnership and a mining partnership that there be a 
·sharing of losses. Or. stated conversely, where the agree-
ment precludes a sharing of losses no partnership arises. 
Of course, the parties could form a partnership as to 
third parties and limit losses as between themselves, but 
here there is no such intent and the only question is 
whether the agremnent established a partnership by 
implication of law and contrary to the intentions of the 
parties. 
The agreement that no losses should be bourne by 
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('J'OHH-appt>llantH prevented the implication of a partner-
:-;hip. Fanners' and Merchants' National Bank v. Ander-
son, :2:)0 N. W. 214, 216 Iowa 988; Farmers' Coop v. 
Furnll'rs' Union, 260 Pac. 7'55, 127 Okl. 27·5; McAnally 
r. Cochran, 170 Okl. 368, .f() Pac 2d 955;Ash et al vs. 
11! ickdson, 118 Old. 1 fi3, 2-t 7 Pac. 680; 68 C. J. f-.;. 429-430; 
;)s C. J. S. m~H, f>91; 40 Am. Jur. 153; 131 A. L. R. 508, 
;);~~); ~Vhit(~ 1:. Houston l.~nmher Co., 179 Okl. 89, 64 Pac. 
2J 908. 
Fanners' and Merchants' NatiotUJl Bank v. Anderson 
(supra) was an action to enforce liability for debts of an 
oil deYelopment venture on the theory of partnership. 
At pages :n 7-218 of ~50 X. \\~. the court held : 
"*** that, while it is not necessary that such agree-
ment should be express as to all its terms, it is 
necessary that it be shown that it was the under-
standing and intention of the parties that there 
be a community of interest in capital, a sharing 
of the profits, and a mutual liability for the losses; 
and that, in the absence of any one of these ele-
ments, there can be no real partnership. *** 
"It is quite true that this court has repeatedly 
stated that it is not necessary that there be an 
express agreement establishing mutual liability 
for losses, and that, where the community of 
interest in capital and division of profits is clearly 
11 
: 
shown, the mutual liability for losses will be 1 w implied unless shown to be inconsistent with the 
intention of the parties. It is equally clear that 
under our decisions an express agreement on the 
subject of losses will control, and that if such 
agreement provide for nonliability for lo~ses, this 
fact alone will negative the existence of a partner-
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~hip. A~ said in \·eenstra Y. ~lathe\\'8, 194 Iowa 
7~):~. 190 X. \Y. 3~~. ~)S3: "It is strenuously argued 
by the defendant that tlwre wa8 no partnership 
because there wa8 no agreement for a division of 
lo~~e~. It i~ true that there was no express agree-
Inent for such division. It is not essential that 
there ~hould he, though it is essential to the 
exi8tenee of a partnership that there be a mutual 
liability for losses. In the absence of express 
agreement on the subject of losses, the mutual 
liability for losses will be i1nplied where the fact 
of partnership is established by other evidence. 
Of course, if there be an express agreement on the 
subject of losses, such agreement will control. If 
:-::uch express agree1nent negative the sharing of 
losses, it negatives the partnerhip." *** 
"\Yhere a man has contributed his money to 
and taken the risk of losing it in an enterprise, 
with the distinct understanding and agreement 
that he shall not be liable for any greater amount 
than the money thus contributed, we are unable 
to see the justice or reasonableness of a doctrine 
which says that he must nevertheless be held liable 
to one who has dealt with such enterprise, with 
full knowledge of the terms of the agreen1ent that 
the man who contributed his money to such enter-
prise shall not be liable for any of the debts 
thereof." 
And in our case, where there was no knowledge in Appel-
lant about a possible partnership, Appellant is in better 
position than if it had known all about the agreement. 
68 C. J. ~. Partnerships, pp. 429-430 thus states the rule: 
"Accordingly, as a general rule, the absence 
of a liability to bear the losses or expenses of a 
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husiness ordinarily indicates that no partnership 
was intended or exists, and it has been held that, 
where the effed of an agreement between two or 
more persons in relation to the prosecution of an 
entPrprise provides that, although all are to share 
in the profits one of their number shall incur no 
risk and be chargeable with no loss, the agreement 
is not one of partnership." 
Second, there was no joint control or operation. 
"rhe Joint Operating Agreement (Exhibit C) pro-
vided that "Operator" (Baird and Robbins or their 
corporation) should carry on the drilling operation. This 
Agreement gave "Operator" the "sole right of prospect-
ing and exploring the lands" subject to the agreement 
(Par. III A); gave "Operator" the sole right and discre-
tion to hire and control employees "and such employees 
shall be the employees of the operator and under its sole 
direction and orders" (Par. III B) ; and all Cross-
Appellants had were the rights of inspection and infor-
mation (Par. VII B). This lack of joint operation pre-
vented implication of a partnership or the arising of a 
partnership including Cross-Appellants as members. 
McAnally v.s. Cochran (supra); 
U.S. vs. Wholesale Oil Co. (C. C. A. 10), 154 Fed. 
2d 745; 
Johanson Brothers Builders vs. Board of Review, 
Industrial Commission (Utah 19·50) 22'2 Pac. 
563, 567; 
Bentley vs. Brossard (supra); 
131 A. L. R. 508, 540, 541 ; 
68 C.J.S., 42·5-426; 58 C.J.S. 688; 
4 Summers Oil and Gas. S ecs. 723, 724. 
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The requisites of a 1uining partnership are thus 
~tated in 58 C. J. ~. 688: 
"\Yith respect to the ele1nents of the relation 
of a n1ining partnership each case must neces-
sarily be determined by its own facts. However, 
there are three basic requiren1ents which must 
always be pre~ent for the creation and existence 
of the relationship, and they are co-ownership, 
joint operation, and an agreement to share in 
profits and losses. It has been also held that, in 
addition to the above, community of interest and 
mutual agency are also necessary. ***" 
This treatise goes on to consider these three ele-
ments in greater detail, stating that joint ownership is 
not sufficient to make a mining partnership, nor is 
mutual agency, and as to the requisite of joint operation, 
makes this statement at page 690: 
"Joint operation. An agreement for coopera-
tion and the joint working of a mine is essential to 
the creation of a mining partnership; and in some 
jurisdictions an actual joint operation or develop-
Inent is essential. As a general rule a mining 
partnership arises when two or more co-owners 
or lessees of a mining claim actually engage in 
working it and share according to the interest of 
each, although there is no express agreement 
between them to become partners; but mere joint 
operation of a mine or well will not necessarily 
create a partnership." 
The same question was discussed 1n McAnally vs. 
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('u('hran (Hupra) where an agreement was rnade to use 
well-drilling tools and in consideration thereof to assign 
an interPHt in the lease, the borrower of the tools under-
taking the actual drilling and doing the hiring and pay-
ing of employPPH. The court held that operation of a 
mining leaHe IJy <'o-tenants did not establish a mining 
partnership and quoted the following language from 
Gillespie rs. Shufflin, 91 Okl. 72, 216 Pac. 132 at page 
956 of 46 Pae. ~d : 
"In order to constitute a mining partnership, 
the parties must cooperate in developing a lease 
for oil and gas, each agreeing to pay his part of 
the expenses and to share in the profits or 
losses. ••• 
"Inter sese, there must be an intention of the 
partners to do so, in order to create a partnership 
and such intention cannot be inferred, alone, from 
a joint venture in drilling a well." 
The Court then quoted fron1 the earlier case of Ash et al 
vs. Mickelson, 118 Okla. 163, 247 Pac. 680: 
"A mining partnership or joint adventure 
cannot exist, unless there is a cooperation among 
the parties in the development of a lease for oil 
and gas, each agreeing to pay his part of the 
expenses and to share in the profits and losses.*** ) ~ 
"The mere holding of an interest in an oil · ijJ 
and gas lease and leasehold estate with other 
co-tenants and having knowledge that a well was 
being drilled thereon by one or more of the co-
tenants does not constitute "cooperation" as con-
templated by the authorities herein cited." *** 
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"There i~ no evidence in the record that showl:; 
or tends to show that the owners of the leasehold 
estate eYer eonten1plated a partnership among 
the Yarious 0\nwrs of the lease at the tirne they 
purchased an interest in same, sonte of which 
were before the well was ever begun. Neither does 
the evidence show or tend to show that there was 
any such agreernent between the parties during 
the progress of the drilling of the well, nor as to 
the operation and 1nanage1nent of the well after 
production was found. The parties never came 
together for the purpose of perfecting such an 
arrangement. J. F. Root and F. S. Hoxie had 
exclusive control during the drilling of the well 
and with no authority to act for any other co-
tenant, and the same is true after they had reached 
the Skinner sand and had decided to make a well 
therein. It is not shown that any of the other 
parties of interest was ever consulted about 
ernploying labor for cleaning the well or doing 
any of the other many things necessary to be done 
at a new well, or in purchasing tankage or other 
equipment necessary therefor. Neither does the 
testiinony show that the parties in rharge had any 
authority to act for others." 
In United States vs. Wholesale Oil ComzJany (supra) 
the question was to detennine whether a partnership 
existed in the operation of retail gasoline filing stations 
or whether the relation was that of employer and 
employee. The station rnanagers had a nwnthly drawing 
I; account which was charged against one half of the profits, 
the business could not be sold without thP. approval of 
tlw eornpan~T and when an operator quit the business 
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there was an accounting of profits between them and no 
distribution of assets. In holding that there was no 
partnership the Court stated at page 748: 
"Neither did the operator have the right to 
exercise his independent judgment in the man-
agement and operation of his business. *** The 
busine~s was conducted in the name of the com-
pany: the bank account was kept in the name of 
the company in a hank designated by it; the 
checks were written against the account only by 
the company and none were written against this 
account by the operator save that in an emer-
gency he might draw a check against the account. 
••• Neither did he assume any liability for the 
debts of the so-called partnership or joint adven-
ture. He did not become liable for merchandise 
accounts or for other obligations incurred by the 
company." 
As a test of joint operations this language is close. 
to the activities of the parties here. The Baird and Rob-
bins Company made all decisions concerning the drilling 
of the well, controlled all of the funds in bank accounts 
to which Cross-Appellants were strangers, purchased 
all supplies, employed all laborers and supervisory 
employees, and never at any time consulted with Cross-
Appellants or anyone else concerning decisions to be 
made in the drilling of the well. It seems obvious that if 
Cross-Appellants had attempted to interfere in any way 
with drilling of this well as a partner would have a right 
to do, Baird and Robbins would have pointed to the joint 
operating agreement and advised Cross-Appellants to 
:il.' 
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.,. 
I i11' 
l ·m ~:· 
I
."" I}~ 
I' 
1 
~rl I, 
r " 
I ~1 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
41 
t: ~tay out of the drilling- operation. rro suppose that Cross-
~! Appellant~ could have 1nade purcha:-;e::-; for the drilling-
of this well and bound Baird and Robbins thereby would 
be to ~treteh thi~ operating- ag-reen1ent beyond any rea-
sonable interpretation-and yet, if a mining- partnership 
were intended between parties ~uch aetivities would 
have been reasonable. The intention of the parties as 
expressed in the operating- ag-ree1nent neg-atives any pos-
~ihle intended joint operation. 
lnJohanson Brothers Builders l's. Board of Review 
(supra) the Industrial Connnission determined that no 
partnership existed under a plan whereby a brick mason 
ag-reed with other brick masons that they would work 
together on various jobs all of which would be obtained 
by Carl Johanson each of them to share in the profits 
according- to a formula. This Court pointed out that 
under the rtah Statute a partnership is "an association 
of two or more persons to carry on as co-partners of a 
business for profit" and also that "all partners have 
equal rig-hts in the Inanag-ement and conduct of the part-
nership business." The Court held that no partnership 
was established because, as further pointed out at page 
567, the bank account was carried in the nmne of Carl 
F. Johanson and wife and no one else had a right to 
draw on it; Johanson mingled contracting business funds 
with other income; all the equipment belonged to J ohan-
son and there was no acquisition of an interest in such 
assets by the other interested parties ; and only Carl 
.Johanson could have contracted for any job. The practi-
cal tests applied to that case could he equally applied to 
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thiH case. Baird and Robbins owned trucks, and pre-
~umahly ~orne other equipment (see Exhibit C, Par. 
IV B), leased equipment, made all decisions concerning 
operations, banked the money in their account mingling 
it with other funds in hoth the Continental and Bank of 
\'t>rnal accounts and consulted with Cross-Appellants in 
no particular. 
rnlP question of llllDIDg partnership WaS Carefully 
considered by this court in Bentley vs. Brossard (supra) 
in 1908. In that case one Fannof owned a mine and 
entered into a lease with one Brossard for development 
of the mine in equal interests, with the proviso that 
Fannof should not be held for any of the expenses or 
losses. The lease required Brossard to work and develop 
the claims in a proper manner, to employ a specified 
number of men, to sell the ore and divide the proceeds in 
an agreed manner. Fannof could be employed if the. 
operation was with steam. Brossard also had the right 
to purchase an interest in the property at a given price. 
Brossard then entered into agreement with other people 
who were made defendants with him in the case, these 
people agreeing to advance certain sums of money "for 
development of said mining claims and the carrying 
I., .• 
I 
I-. 
i . 
I " 
..i.l~ 
I
'"
out of" the Fannof contract. Proceeds accruing- to Bros-
._.. ) I 
sard were to be shared with the people he interested. 
Brossard had charge <lf the work and supervised it 
although there was evidence that the other contributors 
joined in the operation and participated in the decisions. 
Action was brought by a laborer against Brossard and 
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tho~e intere~ted with hin1, and although Fannof te~t ified 
at the trial he was not rnade a party defendant. 
The trial court subrnitted the (•asP to the jury on 
the question of the rnining partnership and the Suprerne 
Court held that the contracts and the evidence con-
stituted a mining partnership as a matter of law . 
.:\lthough Fannof appears to be in the position that the 
Cros~-)qJpellants are in here, he was not nrade a party 
in that action. The Court held that the contract itself 
created the relationship of partnership quoting a decision 
- that the requisites of joining together for the common 
benefit, each contributing property or services, and hav-
ing a connnunity of interests in the profits was suffi-
cient (page 407 of 33 Utah). The court discussed the 
requirement of sharing losses and further that the agree-
ment to share profits with nothing said about losses was 
prima facie an agreen1ent to share losses which is also 
necessary to a partnership (page -!08). At the bottorn 
of the same page the court relies heavily upon the con-
tract between Brossard and Fannof which was the 
inducement of the subleases, and it was this contract 
which cornmitted the sublessees to the program of work-
ing and developing the mines in accordance with the 
lease. It was irnpossihle for them to undertake to per-
form the Fannof contract without associating thernselves 
together within the contemplation of that contract (page 
409). The court also discussed the distinctions between 
a mining partnership and an ordinary commercial part-
nership. None of these distinctions is significant in the 
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flt·ullt'.'l <'Use or in the case at bar and there is no rule 
that a mining partnership is more easily fonned or is 
fon11Pd again~t the plainly expressed intention of the 
part iPl" any more than is a ~ommercial or trading part-
IIPI'ship. \\'<' still have to read the contract and deter-
rnillP ib intent. The court explained the fact of Bros-
sard's doing the work on the theory that he was made 
the general manger by the partners, and it was proper 
for a gPneral manager to take control of the operations. 
Specificall~· the differences between that case and 
the case at bar are that the contributors in the Bentley 
case wPre necessarily committed to the contract requiring 
development of the mine and nothing in the sublease 
negatived the implications of full responsibility for 
carrying out that contract. In our case there is no 
obligation of development outside the Joint Operating 
Agreement. This agreement specifically negatives the 
joint responsibility for 1nutual operation as to this well. 
Cross-Appellants were investors in oil and gas 
leases. They wanted to be sure a well was drilled on the 
property in which they were acquiring an interest. This 
is a con1mon practice and a normal approach which a 
prospective investor would take in connection with pur-
chase of an undivided interest in an oil well. The growth 
of oil exploration in Utah gives this case more signifi-
cance than it would have had ten years ago. It is not 
ordinarily the intention of investors to become partners 
with well drillers, nor is it the expectation of suppliers 
to hold interest holders responsible for materials furn-
ished to well-drillers. 
;t( 
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In accordance with the intention of tlw partieH and 
the agreement which was carefully prepared to guard 
against this \'ery liability, this court should hold that 
no mining partnership a ro~e under the joint operating 
agreement. 
~-\_ppellants were doing busines~ in rtah by causing 
interstate commerce in their products to end at the 
Vernal warehouse, by incorporating their products in 
their r tah business and making local sales in substantial 
quantity to all who came for the products. The original 
package doctrine should not be given any such absolute 
effect as to create a barrier to control where none in fact 
exi~ts. 
The Joint Operating Agreement between the parties 
guards against sharing of losses by Cross-Appellants 
which is significant in determining whether a partner-
ship was intended to arise. The lack of practicable con-
trol over the drilling operation is further evidence that 
the incidents of a partnership did not exist and that no 
partnership was intended. To argue otherwise is to con-
tend that the essentials incidental to a partnership which 
were carefully excluded by the agreement will now be 
made a part of the agreement by force of law. This would 
not only ignore the intention of the parties but destroy 
their power to contract. There has been no holding out 
of partnership, no representation of any kind and no 
reliance by Appellants on the existence of a partnership 
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or on the <'l'Pdi t of' Cros~:~-Appellants. There is no reason 
to diHn•!-!;ard the corporate entity and the Court should 
hold the finding as to that erroneous and prejudicial 
and, eitlwr grant a new trial, or direct that the judgment 
be vacated and judgment of no cause of action entered. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RICHARDS AND BIRD AND 
DAN S. BUSHNELL 
Attorneys for Respondents 
and Cross Ap([Jellamts. 
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